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This essay proposes to look at the process of introducing Western “scientific” concepts 
of “race” into China in terms of a negotiated process of “glocalisation” (Robertson), i.e. of 
being global and local at the same time. In comparison to other terms like indigenisation, 
appropriation, adaptation etc., the advantage of the “glocalisation” approach is to acknowl-
edge the remaining link (and even at times contribution) to global discourse while at the 
same time focusing on a specific locality into which something is introduced and by which it 
is framed. This essay will demonstrate on the one hand in which ways linguistic, cultural 
and above all historical contingencies were of crucial importance in the process of glocalising 
“race” in China; on the other it will show how the specific motivation of individual actors 
made for notable twists in this development. Thus, it will become evident that although the 
Western “race” concept was taken up by various Chinese, this should not just be interpreted 
as a passive submission to an “imposed hegemonic discourse” but rather as an active 
manipulation by different “glocalisers” with their own ends, at times consciously using 
the pseudo-scientificy of a global discourse to fight against local, i.e. inner-Chinese adversaries. 
For demonstrating the above, a close reading and a historical contextualisation of texts 
and authors is proposed here, focusing on texts by Chinese intellectuals of the time. 
Introduction 
China has often been cited as a case of “cultural ethnocentrism” (sinocentrism) 
vs. “racial ethnocentrism”. In fact, even though “racial” definitions of self are not 
entirely absent in pre-modern China,1 the historically dominant trend – in the sense 
of elite Confucian literati culture which produced the main sources which we still 
use today – was to define “Chineseness” in cultural terms.2 In this view, one could 
become accepted as “Chinese” if one took on Chinese cultural habits. This led to 
the widespread image of the “melting pot”, which e.g. explained early Chinese 
contacts with “barbarians” primarily in the framework of acculturation and assimil-
ation, a classic example being the treatment of alien dynasties on “Chinese soil” in 
Chinese historiography which are portrayed in Chinese terms according to the 
paradigm of “sinicisation”.3 This was also closely linked to a concentric image of 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Dikötter (1992: ch. 1), stimulated also by the predating works of specialists on late imperial 
China and the Manchus like Pamela Crossley. “Racial” is to be understood here very broadly in 
the sense of perceived special biological traits common to groups of people. 
2
 It was primarily mainstream Confucianism that constructed culture as defining “Chineseness”, 
whereas sources closer to folk beliefs (and some minor strands in elite discourse) suggest the 
existence of some “proto-racialised” views (Dikötter 1992, ch. 1). 
3
 A divergent view was proposed, among others, by Wolfram Eberhard (1952), for the early alien 
dynasties (3rd to 6th century) in Northern China, but the subsequent debate centred mostly on the 
later ones (since the 12th century), being stimulated, among others, by Tao Jing-shen (1976). For a 
thoughtful review of Western and Chinese approaches to Chinese “ethnicity” see Crossley (1990). 
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the world: the nearer to the centre, the more Chinese, the farther away, the more 
“barbaric”; the “radiating centre”, though, supposedly of almost “irresistible attrac-
tion” to the “barbarians”.4 Differences within this cultural in-group with shadowy 
boundaries were framed in locality (place of origin) and descent which were usual-
ly closely linked, and status, the most “cultured” being the educated elite (Harrell 
1992: 18). Thus, the more appropriate image would be a pyramid, integrating the 
“horizontal” geographical concentric image of “inner–outer” or “centre–periphery” 
with a social/educational “vertical” dimension of “higher–lower”. Biological traits, 
though, were of no primary concern. This has been attributed to the relative lack of 
phenotypic variance encountered inside “China” (e.g. with the so-called “minor-
ities” who were rather identified through divergent cultural features and descent) or 
in territories bordering on China (Dikötter 1992: x). Even though “Chinese” came 
into contact time and again with other peoples from farther away and noted physi-
cal differences,5 the received historiographical (and visual) sources do not demon-
strate any overt interest in them or, rather, there was more curiosity than outright 
disdain (Hildebrand 1987). Only animosity for other reasons led to decidedly 
deprecating views of bodily/physical difference (e.g. racialised to “racist” views on 
Westerners in the 19th century vs. a basically “non-racialised” view of Westerners 
in the 17th/18th century – a period when Westerners were much rarer, locally re-
stricted and in contact primarily with literati or business elites). Even in cases where 
a “proto-nationalist” tendency in China has been found,6 namely since the Song 
dynasty (960–1276), entailing a stronger “ethnicist” consciousness of what defined 
“a Chinese” (Han) in drawing the line against foreign threatening powers (which, in 
the end, achieved the first complete domination of “China” in her history with the 
Mongols), real or perceived biological traits were not an important argument in de-
fining “Chineseness”, and hatred of “the other” was primarily culturally and politi-
cally motivated but did not remain prominent after foreign rule ended. The indigenous 
Ming dynasty, following the era of Mongol domination, translated this heightened 
Chinese ethnic self-awareness into a fad for genealogies and even developed some 
idea of “purity of blood” against the traditionally dominant interpretation of genealogy 
based primarily on social-ritual factors; and in the subsequent Qing dynasty, again 
founded by foreigners, this time the Manchus, a first “racial” self-definition by the 
latter can be attested to in the 18th century, but this was mainly designed (and in-
vented) for self-reference and for bolstering internal cohesion of the ruling group. 
It was not until middle of the 19th century – a time when Western influence had 
                                                 
4
 For this model see Müller (1980: 43–76) and Fairbank (1968). 
5
 Contact with other peoples was frequent and reported in historical writings especially since 
the Han dynasty (206 BC – 202 AD). Apart from historical encounters, there is, of course, also 
the realm of fantasies about others to be considered which also coloured views on foreigners to a 
certain extent. Here, in fact, imagined physical difference was an important aspect. 
6
 On Chinese “proto-nationalism” see the works of Hoyt C. Tillman (1979) and Rolf Trauzettel 
(1975). 
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started to make its presence felt –, that a first “peak” of “pre-scientific” race con-
cepts can be discerned with the huge and in itself also ethnically marked Taiping 
uprising, struggling against the Manchu-Qing, which in its promulgations defined 
both “Chinese” (Hanzu) and “Manchus” (Manzu) vis-à-vis each other, including an 
element of “systematic hatred” that even translated into local attempts at genocide.7 
Still, this was only developed in and aimed at a specific historical setting; it was not 
yet elaborated or systemised on a more general scale. This is hardly surprising since 
in the West, too, the latter could only build upon a modern “biologist” and “scientist” 
medical understanding of the “fixed” and “categorisable” material body which con-
trasted with traditional, more “fluid” Chinese views of the body.8 
The Western “scientific” theory of mankind being divided into “races”,9 assigning 
the Chinese to the “mongoloid” / “yellow” race, was introduced in China in the late 
19th century. The theory itself went back to Bernier, Buffon, Kant (the first to speak 
of a “yellow race”, though not intending China) and Blumenbach, “father” of anthro-
pology as a “scientific” discipline, who propagated the influential theory of man-
kind being divided into five races, one of them being the “mongoloid” “yellows” living 
in Asia. This concept was popularised and systematically matched with supposed 
mental and cultural characteristics to “demonstrate” the “inequality of races” by 
Gobineau and Chamberlain in the second half of the 19th century. Thus, at the time, 
more or less accepted “scientific knowledge” suggested the existence of differently 
coloured “races” inhabiting certain parts of the world and being graded in their 
“civilised” status, usually numbering the “whites” in Europe, the “yellows” in con-
tinental Asia, the “blacks” in Africa, the “reds” in America and the “browns” in mari-
time Asia, even though a simpler threefold structure of the “whites”, “yellows” and 
“blacks” was also current. 
The introduction of these ideas into China was influenced by two factors: On the 
one hand, works by Western missionaries started to make these ideas known via 
translations or summaries; on the other hand, and with much greater long-term effect, 
Japanese works and translations moulded Chinese perceptions, so that the newly 
coined Chinese terms for “race” in fact were almost exclusively graphic loans from 
Japanese. (This, of course, holds true for much of modern Chinese scientific vo-
                                                 
7
 For the above, see Crossley (1990: 8, 11, 28). One may add that the Manchus were identified 
as “devils” and thus also integrated in the religious symbolism of the Taipings. The Christian 
concept of the “heathen” very probably played a role in this classification. For Taiping “theology” 
see Wagner (1982). 
8
 Several examples which Dikötter (1992) cites for pre-modern cases of proto-“racial” views in 
China appear as “racial” only if interpreted in the light of a modern “biologist” and “materialist” 
medical understanding of the body, which the Chinese arguably did not share at the time. 
9
 The literature on this topic is extensive. For a concise overview of the historical development 
of Western “race” concepts from the perspective of the history of the term, see, for example, 
Conze/Sommer (2004). For a sociological perspective see Banton (1977, 1987); for a historical 
perspective, integrating the problem of “racism” in this framework, see Mosse (1978) and Geiss 
(1988). Ivan Hannaford (1996) presents an approach from intellectual history. 
156  Gotelind Müller 
cabulary.10) Terms used for “race” in China since the 1890s included renzhong 
(Jap. jinshu; lit. “man-kind”), zhongzu (Jap. shuzoku; lit. “kind-lineage”),11 minzu 
(Jap. minzoku; lit. “people-lineage”, concurrently used also as a translation term for 
“people” in the sense of Volk and “nation”)12 or zhonglei (Jap. shurui; lit. “kind-
category”), all transporting specific shades of meaning via the characters chosen.13 
Renzhong was the closest to a biological-anthropological interpretation, zhonglei 
was a “neutral” categorisation without specific reference to human beings, whereas 
both zhongzu and minzu included the lineage element, with minzu (adding the 
“people” character) being the term closest to a purely social interpretation. And it was 
especially the latter term that sparked the most heated debates due to its ambiguous 
shifting between “race”, Volk and “nation”.14  Though the terms renzhong and 
zhongzu ultimately became established as translation terms for “race”, the other terms 
are still not entirely obsolete even today; the multifaceted minzu especially retains 
some “racial” flavour. This in itself suggests a certain malleability of the whole 
“race” concept in Chinese via “flexibility” in linguistic options.15 
But for the named linguistic aspects, when introducing Western “race” concepts it 
also became an issue of who was to be subsumed under these categories – a question 
                                                 
10
 See Gao (1958); Gao/Liu (1984); Liu (1995), updating Gao/Liu’s lists by integrating Federico 
Masini’s work on the linguistic contributions of the missionaries in China; Lackner/Ame-
lung/Kurtz (2001), focusing on some chosen terms.  
11
 There is some discussion about the historical meanings of zu. The term’s shades of meaning 
varied through history but its early meaning has now been shown by Gassman to be a kinship term 
(translated by him as Sippe which I render here as “lineage”), i.e. a subdivision of a “sub-clan” 
or “tribe” (Stamm; zong), again subsumed under the over-arching “clan” (Klan; xing), sharing the 
same family name. In any case its original meaning is (even if ascribed) genealogical, not local 
(as e.g. Crossley assumes), though people supposed to be of the same kin usually lived close to 
each other, thus blurring the line between genealogy and territory (Gassmann 2006). 
12
 The term minzu seems to have appeared in China as early as 1837 (Fang 2007: 159), but was 
not yet used as a translation term for “race”. 
13
 It might be noted that in Hepburn’s Japanese–English/English–Japanese dictionaries the term 
“race” in the biological sense only appears in 1886 (3rd edition), providing also as a subentry “human 
race” or “human species” and “anthropology”, rendered by jinrui and jinruigaku respectively. 
(An “Anthropological Society” [Jinrui Gakkai] had been formed in Japan shortly before, i.e. in 
1884). Thus, the term “race” in the sense of a subdivision of the human species seems not to have 
gained currency even in Japan before that time, in spite of the first Japanese book on anthropology 
appearing in 1874, using the term jinshu. (The various editions of Hepburn’s dictionaries can be 
accessed via www.meijigakuin.ac.jp/mgda/index.html.) For reference to the introduction of 
anthropology into Japan see Ishikawa (2003). 
14
 See Dikötter’s long note in (1992: 108–110 [n. 41]). Incidentally, minzu (minzoku) in its Japa-
nese usage seems to have had strongly “national” overtones via its nativist and populist associa-
tions. See Harootunian (1988), cited also by Crossley (1990: 20 [n. 39]). 
15
 For the different uses see also Chow (2001). 
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that was already inconsistently answered in the West.16 Some authors, when referring 
to “the yellows” or “mongoloids”, had generically intended “the Asians”, some ex-
cluded the Indians, others excluded the Malays as a “race” in itself etc. The Chinese in 
the late 19th century, in any case, found themselves grouped with (somewhat varying) 
others under the label “yellow” or “mongoloid”. How did they view and react to this? 
Two cases were of special salience in this regard at the time when Western notions 
of “race” were being introduced: one was the being grouped with the ruling Manchus 
and all (other) “minorities” in China. When anti-Manchu nationalism arose about 
1900, this came to be seen by Han nationalists as problematic since the question 
entailed the issue of domination, i.e. power relations. The other case was the being 
grouped together of China and Japan – two countries whose relationship was under-
going a substantial shift at the time.17 Japan herself struggled with this Western 
categorisation in the contested process of self-definition between (Western) “civili-
sation” and “Asianness”, highlighting the ever present interference between “racial” 
and “cultural” categories. The parallel case on the Chinese side will be addressed in 
the following, focusing on the struggle with “glocalising” (in the sense of Robert-
son)18 the Western concept of “race” in China in the specific setting of the time, 
the problems this generated and the motives that were driving (or hampering) it. 
Are we “yellow”? 
When the Chinese found out in the late 19th century they were defined by the 
West according to supposed skin colour as “yellow”, this came quite as a surprise. 
Skin colour had not been an important issue, rather difference of “fair” and “dark” 
complexion signified (as in early modern Europe) social distinction between the 
wealthy and the poor who had to work in the fields etc. (Dikötter 1992: 10–13). If 
                                                 
16
 The great variety of Western schemes, ranging from three “races” to several hundred, was also 
introduced in China. See Guanyun, i.e. Jiang Zhiyou, “Zhongguo renzhong kao” (Investigation 
into the Chinese race), a very long article in many instalments in the reformist journal Xinmin 
congbao (1903: 61). The problem also entailed the question of whether “races” are eternally sta-
ble entities or may change over time. 
17
 One may note, though, that Gobineau (writing in the 1850s) – for all his influence – saw the 
Chinese (to whom he even dedicated a whole chapter), Mongols and Finns as the main examples 
of the “yellow race”, whereas the Japanese were regarded as a mixture with black and “maybe some 
white” “racial components” (Gobineau 1898–1908, II: 358; 1983, I: 605). Therefore, even though 
the Japanese were said to have been influenced by Chinese “yellow” “civilisation” (like the Koreans), 
they are briefly dealt with in the chapter on “the origin of the white race”, not in the chapter on the 
“yellow race”. The general “yellowing” of the Japanese in Western racial taxonomies obviously 
had to do with their rising importance in world politics during the Meiji era (since 1868). 
18
 Robertson (1998: 192–200; I refer to the German version since the newest English reprint in 
Robertson/White 2003 reproduces an older version than the reworked German one). It may be 
recalled here that the term “glocalisation” has been coined with a view to the Japanese term do-
chakuka used in economics for an adaptation of globally distributed products to target markets. 
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anything, Chinese tended to see themselves as of “white complexion” (Dikötter 
1992: 10, referring to Maspéro). Apart from the fact that “yellow” has favourable 
symbolic connotations in Chinese traditional culture, being closely associated with 
the emperor, and apart from the possibility that Jesuit information about the sym-
bolic value of “yellow” in China might have played a role in prompting Westerners 
to finally opt for “yellow” as the supposed skin colour of the Chinese,19 this defini-
tion was clearly a heteronomous one for the Chinese themselves.20 Consequently, 
Chinese reactions (and here I limit myself to intellectuals) were divided: some re-
jected it and advocated auto-defining themselves “white”, others saw no problem 
in accepting a symbolically positive marker, though the realisation of a hierarchy 
between the colours in this Western “race” concept (namely since Gobineau’s 
influential mid-19th century work on the “inequality of the races”) complicated 
things. “Yellow” would be acceptable if it were not inferior to “white”.  
Various strategies were available to cope with this situation. One of these can be 
gleaned from an early reference to Western ideas on “race” in Chinese: The article 
“Renfen wulei shuo” (On the division of men into five categories/races) in the 
                                                 
19
 As Demel (1992) has demonstrated, this took some time to arrive at. “Brown” etc. had also 
been an option. 
20
 Here I disagree slightly with Dikötter (1997: 12f.). Dikötter questions the view that the notion 
of a “yellow race” should have been imposed on the Chinese by the West and argues for various 
antecedents in traditional China, adding, e.g. to the named symbolic value of “yellow” the case 
of Wang Fuzhi, a 17th century intellectual, who named China the “yellow centre” and wrote a 
Yellow book (Huangshu). Wang, however, is a rather isolated voice in this respect with little 
potential to influence (his writings being banned and mostly circulating only as manuscripts in a 
rather closed circle until the mid-19th century; the Yellow Book, e.g. has survived only in a cen-
sured version with many “blanks” (see Wang Fuzhi 1972: xvii). He was consciously picked up, 
“revived” and “used” by later revolutionaries around 1900. In any case one certainly cannot dis-
cern a “common” auto-perception of the Chinese as “being yellow”. Furthermore, Wang’s call-
ing China the “yellow centre” is still a far cry from a definition of a “yellow race” according to 
skin colour, and Wang himself even distinguished the elite from the “common people” as being 
of different stock (something obviously not revived around 1900), thus undermining a possible 
“unity” of “the Chinese”, when simultaneously stating that “the barbarians” and “the Chinese” 
“in their bone structures, sensory organs […] are no different”. Cf. De Bary/Lufrano (2000: 33), 
who conclude that even with Wang, cultural issues remained primary vis-à-vis racial ones; for 
the second part of the reference see De Bary (1960: 547). Of course, Dikötter is completely right 
in stressing that the intellectuals in the late 19th century were not simply on the “receiving end” 
but actively took up the Western race discourse and used it to their own ends (see below); still 
this is not the same as stating that the notion of a “yellow race” was not imposed on the Chinese. 
Furthermore, the lack of frequency of the term “yellow race” (huangzhong) before the 1890s and 
Chinese reactions in the mid/late 1890s, explicitly stating the “newness” of (and sometimes aver-
sion to) this term, suggest it was perceived as heteronomous. Cf. “Bianfa dang xian fang liubi 
lun” in the influential Chinese daily Shenbao (13 June, 1898), where the author claimed the term 
“yellow race” had been in use only “for three to five years”. For the citation see also Janku 
(2003: 187). 
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Western-directed Chinese language journal Gezhi huibian in 1892,21 which presented 
the Blumenbach classification (without mentioning the name), started quite tellingly 
with the “Mongoloids”/“Yellows” before the “Caucasians”/“Whites”, followed by 
the “Africans”/“Blacks”, “Malayans”/“Browns” and finally the “Americans”/“Reds” 
(Blumenbach’s original order had been: 1. Caucasians as the “primary” and “most 
beautiful”, 2. Mongoloids, 3. Ethiopians, 4. Americans, 5. Malayans). Thus, in a subtle 
way the hierarchy implicit in the numbering was changed to suit Chinese readers 
(also upgrading the Asian Malayans vis-à-vis the far away Native Americans). 
That this was no accident is borne out by the fact that in the text itself the “old” 
sequence of Americans-before-Malayans reappears, and that the existence of other 
Western, less “favourable” schemes, integrating the “Americans”, “Malayans” and 
“Mongoloids” into one single “race”, is casually admitted.22 The attached drawing 
also presented the “Mongoloids”/“Yellows” in the “Chinese” fashion of the time, i.e. 
with the Manchurian queue obligatory under Qing rule for every male, thus making 
the Manchu-Qing dynasty subjects stand for “the Mongoloids”. The negative physical 
or mental features that Blumenbach’s (and followers’) scheme attributed to the 
“Mongoloids” were downplayed, and an image of a race outstanding in wisdom and 
the arts (though somewhat deficient in moral judgement and bound by conventions) 
was presented, including besides the Chinese also Mongols as Manchus, Japanese 
as Koreans, Tibetans as Vietnamese, all of whom comprised this “most numerous 
race” on earth. The “Caucasians”/“Whites”, who follow, were regarded as especially 
skilled in material and practical matters (foreshadowing the later image of the “spiritual 
East vs. the material West”), whereas with the “Africans”/“Blacks” the topic of slavery 
was invariably introduced, the “Malayans”/“Browns” were assigned the status of 
infants not yet knowing to behave morally, whereas the Native “Americans”/“Reds” 
were presented as a totally hopeless case, being unable to be educated. The main 
aim of the presentation, though, was to emphasise the transformative power of 
“today’s civilisation” as an implicit agenda to follow. Furthermore, the article is one 
of the rather rare instances where the term “Mongoloids” (in Chinese equivalent to 
“Mongol” [Menggu]) appears, which was superseded increasingly by the term “yellow 
race” (huangzhong) since the mid-1890s, overcoming the “problematic” identification 
with a one-time enemy, “invader” and current “minority”, dislocating “the Chinese” 
even further.23 
                                                 
21
 The author/translator of the article is not given. John Fryer, the editor, is presumed to have 
written most of the articles, but also had some Chinese staff and other Westerners contribute 
materials (Xiong 1994: 418–426). 
22
 My reading of the article therefore differs from that of Ishikawa (2003) who sees it only as a 
faithful rendering of Blumenbach’s outline but pays no attention to the subtle shifts in presentation. 
23
 The term “mongoloid” (notably used by Blumenbach) necessarily evoked bad memories of 
Mongol domination – the first complete foreign domination of China in her history, but (differ-
ent from the Manchus as the “second case” of complete domination) even degrading China to 
just a part of a world empire.  
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The point of arguing for “reform” could also be made the other way round by using 
precisely the “secondary” status of “yellow” to “white” in this supposedly “scientific” 
and “universal” race concept. Calling for policies that would “whiten” China’s future 
(and thus giving credit to ideas current with both Gobineau and Social Darwinists, 
of an integral link between “race” and “survival” chances for peoples), one could easily 
explain China’s historically factual weakness by its “lack of whiteness”. “Whitening” 
would thus represent the only way to secure one’s future existence in view of the 
threatening “racial competition” which had already claimed several “victims” world-
wide,24 to achieve an era of “equal strength of the whites and yellows”.25 This 
“whitening” program could entail copying Western institutions as well as more bio-
logical tactics like intermarriage. (Not surprisingly, the latter tactic was highly contro-
versial.)26 This was a strategy opted for by, e.g. reformer Yan Fu who in 1895 
(after China’s defeat in the war against Japan) urged educating the “yellow race” 
(obviously intending only the Chinese here) to prevent its perishing,27 or Kang 
Youwei, who rhetorically accepted the “priority” of “white”, transforming this into 
his agenda to reform China which culminated in his ill-fated 1898 reform endeavours, 
and later in his work Datong shu (Book of the Great Union) into a program of racial 
amalgamation, dissolving the “yellows” via intermarriage into the “whites” (again 
relegating the “hopeless” case to “inferior races”, i.e. “the browns” and especially 
“the blacks” who would not be able to “whiten”).28 Apart from the final utopian 
rendering, Kang’s argument was not intended as a glorification of “whiteness” in a 
racial sense (nota bene: he occasionally switched from “white/yellow” to “silver/gold”, 
implying a reversed hierarchy of values),29 but identified “whiteness” basically as 
                                                 
24
 The usual reference was to the Indians as having lost their “nation” in this competition with 
the British, and the Native Americans as having been nearly extinguished as a “race”. See e.g. 
Liang (1903b: 71) in the reformist Xinmin congbao. 
25
 See e.g. the outline of the revolutionary 1904 treaties on “Chinese history” by Tao (1986: 226). 
26
 One major early proponent was late 19th century reformer Kang Youwei, even though his most 
radical (or “utopian”) ideas became known widely only very late, i.e. in the 1930s. But reformer 
Tang Caichang also advocated white-yellow crossbreeding. Cf. citations in Ishikawa (2003: 13). 
See also Teng (2006) and Sakamoto (2004: esp. 329–340). The strategy of intermarriage, though, 
was also advocated by some other social reformers or revolutionaries, e.g. including biologist 
and leading anarchist Li Shizeng (see Müller 2001: 241; not discussed by the authors referred to 
above). On the other hand – as in other parts of the world –, Chinese actually intermarrying with 
other “races” were often ostracised by their co-nationals. 
27
 “Lun kaimin zhi zhi” (On educating the people) in the Western-financed Chinese daily Shen-
bao (27 July, 1895). The article in the daily is not signed but has been identified by Andrea 
Janku in her electronic index to the early Shenbao 1872–1898 (Janku 2002). In the article, the 
“yellow race” is identified as roughly 400 million, which would indicate that Yan regarded only 
the Chinese as the “yellows” here. 
28
 Kang (1935, part 4). For a translation see Thompson (1958: 140–148). 
29
 Strangely, existing scholarship seems to have overlooked this curious but telling switch, includ-
ing the very recent discussion of Kang, which even cites the passage, in Tsu (2005: 43–47). 
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“civilisation”. In this way, he always remained true to his culturalist Confucian frame-
work. Characterising the “yellows” as being equally spread over the globe like the 
“whites” and even superior in wisdom, there was no big gap to bridge in order to 
amalgamate the two, citing also the example of overseas Chinese who had adopted 
Western cultural habits without problems. And Yan Fu, too, obviously identified the 
colours with civilisation, since education would otherwise not be a possible way out. 
Another strategy of coping with imported race concepts was to opt for accepting 
“yellowness” – and turn it into an asset. As [at that time] revolutionary Liu Shipei 
stated: “In recent times […] Chinese30 are called the ‘yellow race’. If we check with 
the Chinese ancient books, [we see] that among the five colours only yellow was 
revered […] In ancient times, yellow was interpreted as the middle and harmonis-
ing colour […] It means also brightness and from this the meaning of “China” is 
derived […] The people on the yellow earth are the Han lineage people” (Liu 
Guanghan [1905]). The focus in this process of “glocalising” the foreign ascription 
was thus significantly shifted away from skin colour – something the above cited 
reformers had already started to do – either towards a purely cultural definition of 
“yellowness” or merging the cultural with biological descent. The latter was done 
in a more elaborate form by constructing a lineage down from the “Yellow Emper-
or” (Huangdi), one of the mythical first rulers of China (nota bene: di in “Huangdi” 
has the original meaning of “divine ancestor”), to “re-invent” “Chineseness”, which 
could, in turn, also be used to differentiate between the only “true Yellows”, i.e. 
the Han, and the non-Han. Thus the figure of the Yellow Emperor turned into a site 
for political contestation among the Chinese reformers (who had been the first to 
revive him in the 1890s)31 and later revolutionaries around the turn of the century. 
Whereas the reformers stressed the cultural side, building up the Yellow Emperor 
as a symbol of pride for all people living in China as heirs of a “great civilisation” 
that was set in motion by the early cultural heroes like “Huangdi”, and consequently 
arguing for their own reform ideas to “preserve Chinese culture”, the revolutionaries 
eagerly took up this politically useful symbol but re-invented Huangdi as an ancestor 
exclusively of the Han, stripping him (also visually) of his emperorship and trans-
forming him into an ancestor with marked military skills and “conquering” abilities 
of that which now was “Chinese soil”.32 Thus, he was declared to be the founding 
father of the Chinese and establisher of their state and the “first nationalist hero” 
                                                 
30
 Significantly, Liu here uses the Sanskrit rendering of “China” in Chinese translation (zhendan), 
indicating an “outsider’s view”. 
31
 Kang Youwei referred to him several times in his private lectures in 1896 as a cultural hero. S 
Kang Youwei quanji (1987–1992, II: 272f., 276). Also see Kang (1897: ch. 4). 
32
 For the development of the image of the “Yellow Emperor” in this period see Sakamoto (1995) 
and especially the richly documented article by Shen (1997). For the shift in the visual treatment 
of Huangdi see the added plates in Shen (1997: 23f., 39). I am grateful to Hsü Hui-ch’i for providing 
me with a copy of Prof. Shen’s article. For a systematisation of the different roles already ascribed 
to the “Yellow Emperor” in early China, see Le Blanc (1985–1986: 45–63). 
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(minzuzhuyi daweiren) on earth.33 At times the revolutionaries also integrated into 
this vision another foreign theory, namely that of the Han’s “Western” origin and 
their migration from Mesopotamia towards the East. This theory, proposed by the 
Frenchman Terrien de Lacouperie, implied a common place of origin with the 
“Western whites” as well as the martial vigour of a conquering race easily subduing 
the “natives” already living in what today is “China” (in a consciously constructed 
parallel to the Aryans or to the Spanish conquest of Latin America).34 A further 
motivation for creating the “Yellow emperor myth” was the Japanese parallel case 
of constructing Japaneseness based on a supposed ancestor of the Japanese emperor, 
Jinmu, even introducing a calendar reckoning starting with his “reign which was 
then also copied by the Chinese revolutionaries for Huangdi (albeit, as already 
mentioned, eliminating the monarchist element). 35  Accordingly, taking up the 
“challenge” of being defined “yellow” could be translated into a conscious strategy 
to build up nationalism in the future around “yellowness”, be it in a culturalist (the 
reformers’ option) or a primarily racial way (the revolutionaries’ option).  
In one way or the other, the blending of nationalism and “yellowness” was common 
to many reformers and revolutionaries around 1900. Yan Fu, the reformer mentioned 
earlier, who aimed at “strengthening the nation”, is one example; revolutionary 
Sun Yatsen, who was primarily preoccupied with a “restricted” definition of “yellow 
race” as equating the Han, blending it with the race-nation (minzu), even though he 
occasionally extended the “race” concept to “Asia” to motivate alliances (namely 
with the Japanese), is another.36 Further examples include Chen Duxiu, later one of 
the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party, who in 1904 was convinced 
that a nation equals a “race” (and therefore argued for the alien Manchus to be 
excluded; Feigon 1983: 63–65). (It should be stressed, though, that in the West as 
well “race” often came to be used synonymously with “nation” at the time,37 thus 
de facto undermining the categorical “unity” of a “white” or “Caucasian” “race”.) 
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 See Huangdi hun (Soul of the Yellow Emperor; 1979), a booklet assembling a host of articles 
on Huangdi by the revolutionaries, published in 1904. 
34
 Cf. Shen (1997: 38, 40). Terrien de Lacouperie’s theory had become known to the Chinese 
mainly via Japanese digests (Ishikawa 2003: 22–25). His work Western Origin of the Early Chi-
nese Civilisation (1894) was reprinted in 1966. 
35
 “Wuwei” (1979). See also Bernal (1976: 99). The reformers, in contrast, opted for a reckoning 
starting with Confucius. 
36
 Though Sun’s own understanding of minzuzhuyi was not very clearly expressed (he propagated 
it as part of his “three principles of the people” in the editorial of the revolutionaries’ main journal 
Minbao (The People) in 1905 (Sun 1905), he had his co-revolutionaries spell it out, namely 
Wang Jingwei, who entered the debate against the reformers’ faction with a long article, “Minzu 
de guomin” (National-racial citizens) also in Minbao, stressing above all the “blood” factor in 
addition to common language, territory, habits and religion (Wang 1905). Sun’s own vagueness 
lent itself to later “adjustments” to this theory. 
37
 See Conze/Sommer (2004: 156–158, 169). Fenton in his new article on race and nation, refer-
ring to Foucault, argues that the shift to identify nation and race has a “counter-revolutionary” 
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Earlier reformers like Kang Youwei, basing himself on Confucianism, had obviously 
viewed “race” in a larger, i.e. supranational context, even if China as a cultural 
category remained central to his political aims. But Liang Qichao, Kang’s one-time 
pupil, moved on to an in-between position: while he shared Kang’s Confucian “larger” 
model he developed a more national interpretation after the turn of the century.38 
He noted, e.g. in 1903, that even though (in the West) Spaniards and English looked 
alike and could not be differentiated at first glance like “whites” from “blacks”, they 
still constituted different “races” because “racial consciousness” was based on two 
factors: biological heredity and psychological features. Therefore, Spaniards and 
English were different “races” due to the second factor which implied a psychic 
“heredity” which was then explained basically as cultural-moral traditions: a neat 
example of blending “race” and “culture”. And without this two-tiered “racial con-
sciousness”, Liang’s brother added, no state could be set up (Liang Qixun 1903: 
esp. 52–54). 
At the time, one may add, Kang and Liang had both gained personal experience 
of “foreignness” by travelling, due to their being exiled after the ill-fated 1898 re-
form, and especially their experiences in America heightened their sensitivity to 
the connection between “race” and discrimination. (This is very evident in Liang’s 
travel reports.39 Quite naturally, he paid special attention to the treatment of Chinese 
in America, but he also noted the fate of the Native Americans.) In any case, Liang 
was especially important in establishing the link between “race” and nationalism in 
the Chinese discourse by his influential articles, namely by focusing on the im-
pending “perishing of the nation” that would come with “racial” weakness. And on 
this basis the revolutionaries now would join the debate. 
Not without significance, Liang Qichao (basically a “reformer”) and many re-
volutionaries (criticising reformism) were soon writing mainly in Japan, where 
they were strongly influenced by their reading of Japanese publications and trans-
lations40 (though using them at times deliberately in a “creative” way to comply with 
their own respective agendas). A telling case in point is Liang’s introducing his 
Chinese readers in 1900 to a piece by Japanese journalist Ishikawa Hanzan on “the 
struggle in the racial world”, arguing that although there were “three races”, i.e. 
white, yellow and black, the “white race” should actually be subdivided into a 
“red-white” (i.e. the Westerners) and a “yellow-white” race (i.e. China – in the Chinese 
version named first –, Japan, Korea, Hungary and Turkey). Who then would be left 
to constitute the “yellow race” was not even discussed (Ishikawa 1900: 3097). Here, 
again, we see an example of only superficially acknowledging Western “scientific” 
                                                                                                                                                             
effect vis-à-vis “race as class” (Fenton 2006: 197). However, for “third world” people, this obvi-
ously could very well have “revolutionary” potential since it was articulated “from below”. 
38
 His first use of “race” categories seems to have been in 1896, echoing Kang’s above-stated 
views of the “yellows” being “almost like the whites” (see Liang Qichao 1896). 
39
 Liang’s travel reports appeared in Xinmin congbao, special edition (Liang Qichao 1903a).  
40
 On the influence of Japan on Liang see Xiajian (2001) and Fogel (2004b). 
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theories and changing it to fit in with their own agendas – a strategy already familiar 
with the Chinese and demonstrating to Chinese readers that the Japanese, as well, 
had developed flexible ways of glocalising Western “race” concepts. And Japan was 
obviously succeeding in her struggle for “racial survival” by this “semi-whitening” 
without denying her “yellow” roots. This was the way Liang thought China must 
follow, too. 
Linked to this whole scenario and providing an important background to the sense 
of crisis shared by many Chinese intellectuals around the turn of the century was the 
Sino-Japanese war 1894/95: China’s unexpected and total defeat by a country viewed 
as culturally dependent on China throughout history (Fogel 2004a; Iriye 1980; Keene 
1971: 121–175; Chu 1980) exposed the utter state of decay in China and – together 
with the scramble for concessions following this “encouraging” exposure of weakness 
to the world which gave rise to the fear of a “splitting of the melon” – first spurred 
the Chinese reform movements, starting with the ill-fated 100-days reform in 1898 
and leading to more revolutionary approaches shortly after the turn of the century. 
Who is “us”? 
The Sino-Japanese war led not only to a perceived urgency for “reform” in China, 
but also gave the question of “race” a new turn: who should count as “our” race? 
Who should count among “the yellows”? 
This problem worked on two layers: one was the inclusiveness or exclusiveness 
inside of China, i.e. with regard to non-Han, namely the ruling Manchus, the other 
beyond China: Who else would “yellowness” or the “mongoloid” race comprise (the 
latter term tended to be avoided in China, as already stated)? Asia or East Asia? 
And, more specifically, were the Chinese and Japanese members of one “race”?41 
As to the first layer, the focus of the debate in the early 1900s was on the “racial” 
relation between Manchu and Han, though it was sometimes extended to include the 
minority of the Miao living in Southern China as the archetypical Chinese category 
of “barbarians” to be “civilised”.42 (Typically, this discussion was not politically 
“neutral” but intertwined “race” and “domination”, including the problem of whether 
the Han had been “imperialists” themselves towards “their” minorities.) In a famous 
debate, Liang Qichao as spokesman of the reformers and proponents of a constitutional 
monarchy by the Manchus, argued for inclusion. On the other hand, anti-Manchu 
revolutionaries used precisely the “racial” difference theory to argue the case for 
toppling the Manchu regime (Gasster 1969: ch. 3, esp. 76–84; Bernal 1976: esp. 
95–99; Furth 1976: esp. 128–139): the Manchus were a “racially retarded” or “lower 
level” ethnic minority that had unjustly usurped the Chinese throne. Therefore, the 
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 As already stated, this question was not answered consistently in the West either, partly being 
due to the influence of the conflation of the categories of “race” and “culture”. 
42
 Cf. Diamond (1995: 99f.). They were also paralleled with the “typical” “race” threatened by 
extinction in the West: the Native Americans. See Liang Qichao (1903b: 71). 
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“higher” Chinese “race” had lived through all the humiliations of the 19th century 
because the “barbarian” Manchus had obstructed “Chinese civilisation”. On the road 
to progress they were the brakes that now had to be removed. In fact, they were 
accused of endangering the Chinese “race” with extinction by their incompetent 
rule. Ousting them was thus necessary for “racial” survival in the Social Darwinist 
struggle setting of the time (Rankin 1971: 26–30). 
The Kang/Liang camp, on the other hand, argued that there was no “racial” differ-
ence between the Manchus and the Han, since the Manchus lived out and practiced 
Chinese cultural norms. Their sinicisation precisely guaranteed their “sameness”. 
(Here, the universalist Confucian background of the reformers becomes evident.) In 
any case, it could be argued that the Manchus had already been part of the Chinese 
empire before their conquest which then, in an interesting argumentative twist, 
could not be considered that “alien”.43 And the current government was run with 
many Han involved, so it had to be seen as “Chinese” for this reason, too. On the 
other hand, the Miao were a highly diversified group of people,44 thus not qualifying 
for the construction of a historical “parallel case” at all. Liang, therefore, suggested 
a “broad nationalism” (da minzuzhuyi) vs. a “narrow” Han-centred one to include all 
peoples living in China,45 though by doing so, he in fact rejected the “race” argument 
altogether for the sake of a common national interest of a multi-ethnic society. Ob-
viously, then, when the revolutionaries started to play the “race” card to support their 
political ends, Liang abandoned the “race” concept that had seemed useful to him 
as long as it meant “the nation” in a political sense, though the ambiguous term minzu 
(“people-lineage”, Volk, nation) used by both sides hid this shift to a certain extent. 
But Liang now clearly distanced himself from a less ambiguous “race” definition con-
noted by the term zhongzu (kind-lineage) and attacked his opponents for using the latter. 
Liang’s allegation of anti-Manchu “racism” in the revolutionaries’ camp, implying 
also “mean” motives of envy and resentment, had been directed mainly against fervent 
anti-Manchu intellectual Zhang Binglin who countered the “sinicisation” thesis of 
the Kang/Liang faction mainly by pointing to the historical fact of the Manchus 
being the rulers, imposing their ways and not the other way round (1981: 51f.), and 
against even more radical calls like those of Zou Rong to “kill the Manchus living 
in China” (1981: 125, 137). To oppose Liang’s accusation of the revolutionaries 
being simply racist, Liu Shipei thus tried to bolster the latter’s position by bringing 
the whole question of minorities, mainly the Miao, into the debate (Liu 1903: esp. 
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 See Liang Qichao under pseudonym “Yinbing” (1906). Liang aimed his attack at the Minbao 
where namely Wang Jingwei voiced the opposing view. Wang pointed out, e.g. that the Manchus 
themselves never claimed to be “Chinese” (Wang 1907: esp. 1892f.). Wang was supported by 
Liu Shipei who (under a pen name) wrote a serialised article in the revolutionaries’ Minbao about 
the Manchus having never been “Chinese subjects” (Weiyi 1907). And much less have they been 
“Chinese” (Weiyi 1907: 2882), though Liu, now claiming to be an anarchist, dissociated himself 
from the earlier “racial” hatred still being advocated by other revolutionaries. 
44
 S.C.Y. (1905) with an introduction by Liang. 
45
 See Zhongguo zhi xinmin (1903: 32), where he introduced these terms. 
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ch. 2). The Mongols, another – but historically more sensitive – issue, were occasion-
nally integrated as well. 
Since the Miao are not Han, Liu concludes, then neither are the Manchus. But 
the Miao are less problematic, because they either migrated after their subjugation 
by Huangdi or were assimilated into the Han race. The Manchus, by contrast, are a 
conquering people with a clear-cut identity and thus cannot be said to have been 
assimilated into the Han at all. They, in fact, use the “white race” to help them 
keep in check the “yellow race” – thus excluding the Manchus from the “yellows” 
who are obviously synonymous here with the Han (Liu 1903: 622). The Han, then, 
are different in terms of territorial spread, language, religion and customs – the 
characteristics that constitute a distinct minzu – from the Mongols, Manchus, Hui 
and Miao (Liu 1903: ch. 17). And Zhang Binglin, in an interesting twist (and in 
factual contradiction to his earlier hailing of Terrien de Lacouperie and Huangdi as 
a “conqueror”), points out during the evolving debate with Liang Qichao, that even the 
argument of a parallel one-time Han “invasion” cannot be proved. Therefore one 
cannot – as the Liang camp had argued – say that the Han then would also have 
been “aggressors”.46 In any case, even if the origin of all mankind were to be 
somewhere West, then the Miao, too, were only immigrants.47  
“Our race” thus became narrowly defined as “Han” and linked to ancestry which 
Liu had already constructed via the “Yellow Emperor theory”: this figure, then, is 
only the progenitor of the Han and not of any of the minorities. According to Liu, 
who based himself on a Japanese source (!),48 the subdivision of the “yellow race” 
in “Chinese” and “Siberians” saw the “Chinese” only as Han, Tibetans and Indo-
Chinese. The “Siberians” grouped together the Japanese (!),49 Tungus (i.e. including 
mainly the Manchus), Mongols and Turkish. Other revolutionaries, though, suggested 
a slightly different division in the larger “yellow race”, first dividing it likewise into 
the two main streams of “Chinese” and “Siberians”, but then subdividing it into 
different groups: according to already named Zou Rong’s influential chart, the 
“Chinese race” included the Han and “others” (specified as Koreans, Burmese, Japa-
nese, Tibetans and “other East Asians”); the “Siberian race” included the Mongols 
(subdivided into Mongols, Manchus, Siberians and “other Asians”) and the Turkish 
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 This, in fact, had been promoted outright by revolutionary Song Jiaoren in 1905 in a positive 
sense (Chow 2001: 62). 
47
 Taiyan (1908: 2f. [reprint 3294f.]). Interestingly, although the article sets out to argue that 
there is a lack of historical evidence to suggest who arrived “first”, it goes on to state that it was 
of course the Han. 
48
 Liu only names “Kuwabara”. The source was China historian Kuwabara Jitsuzō’s (1870–1931) 
Tōyō shiyō (Historical outline of Asia) (Liu 1903: ch. 1, 599). 
49
 For the Japanese motives in distancing themselves from the Chinese and the implications for 
devising schemes of differentiation in Asian populations see Tanaka (1993) Ching (1998). Ching 
stresses that around the time of the Russo-Japanese War and Western “Yellow Peril” rhetoric 
directed against the Japanese, these tended to “draw” themselves out of the “yellow” category 
altogether, assigning the latter exclusively to the Chinese. 
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(including the Turkish, the Hungarians and “other European Yellows”). But Zou 
Rong himself gave a somewhat different categorisation in the text preceding the 
chart, though he like Liu clearly stressed that the Manchus were definitely not part 
of the “Chinese” category (though keeping them here in the “yellow” category, 
obviously for lack of alternatives),50 but still leaving a close reader of Zou Rong’s 
inflammatory tract bewildered by these contradictions in the space of two pages.51 
This, again, leads to the conclusion that the whole enterprise of glocalising “scientific” 
“race” categories was highly malleable. (And it should be noted that these utterances 
were made in polemical literature where logical consistency was not a primary concern, 
whereas the same authors often argued less “racially” in their other writings.52) 
Revolutionary par excellence, Sun Yatsen, and his followers as well were further 
telling examples of the “flexibility” of “racial” boundaries: first, when anti-Manchuism 
was on the main agenda, the principle of “nationalism” (minzuzhuyi) was clearly 
defined “racially” against inclusion of the Manchus.53 After the Manchu court had 
abdicated and the Republic was established, the agenda was to argue for the “in-
heritance” of all territory under the Manchu-Qing dynasty, i.e. including minority 
terrain. Now, it was argued that the “five races” of China (one of them the Manchus) 
constituted the “nation”. In other words, the “Han” were still seen as constituting a 
“race”, but only as part of what should be the “Chinese” nation. But later the trend 
changed towards inclusion of the minorities in a single “Chinese race” to bolster 
internal cohesion (Leibold 2006: 181–220) – ironically reviving reformer and one-
time arch-rival Liang Qichao’s call for a “broad” understanding of the race-nation.  
On the “outward” level, the “racial” relation especially between China and Japan 
was a constant issue. As long as Japan was in the position of a traditional “vassal” 
country, the question from the Chinese perspective was not pressing: the Japanese 
were usually called “dwarfs” (wo), which obviously had a “racist” flavour.54 But in 
terms of culture, they were acceptable, since they had proven “receptive” to Chinese 
civilisation. 
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 We saw earlier that Liu at other times equated the “yellow race” exclusively with the Han. 
Therefore, it seems obvious that here the “totality” of a chart necessitated a solution to the “colour” 
assignment of the Manchus, whereas in the above-cited case Liu had simply excluded them, 
without bothering about suggesting an “alternative”. 
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 See Zou Rong (1981: 129) vs. scheme on p. 130. 
52
 The aspect of intended audiences has often been disregarded hitherto in evaluating such “racist” 
comments. 
53
 Ironically, one of the major spokesmen in the pages of the revolutionaries’ journal Minbao 
was Wang Jingwei, later noted in history for his “flexibility” to redefine “Chineseness” in a way 
suitable to his Japanese-sponsored “puppet” regime in Nanjing during WW II. 
54
 The term has been also explained as of (at least partly) phonetic character, but clearly came to be 
understood in time as derogatory. If not read as purely phonetic, it combined the meaning of “crooked” 
with the classifier (“radical”) for “human being”, thus inviting semantic interpretation. 
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Things changed dramatically with the First Sino-Japanese War. Even though some 
Chinese diplomats had realised earlier that Japan was a growing factor in power 
politics, and even though China had “magnanimously” given in to Japan several times 
since the 1870s (notably on suzerainty issues concerning the Ryūkyū archipelago, 
Taiwan and Korea), China never would have thought about not being able to stand 
up to Japan. With the Sino-Japanese war and China’s blatant defeat, the relation-
ship to Japan was turned upside down. Significantly, only after the war, which was 
seen in the West as a war between the “yellows”, did Japan become the primary 
symbol of “yellow peril” for the West,55 and the term “yellow race” only then became 
common in China also.56 Before, it had been China holding the place for “the yellows” 
and their possible endangering the West in Western minds, partly connected to Chinese 
emigration since the middle of the 19th century.57 
Those in China bound on reform argued that Japan should be the model, precisely 
because she was culturally and “racially” “close”: if the Japanese as “part of the 
yellow race” could “civilise” (i.e. Westernise), the Chinese should be able to do so 
as well. Thus, Kang Youwei, for instance, proposed the Japanese as an example in 
the 1890s. And Liang Qichao in 1896 stated explicitly that since the “whites” and 
“yellows” were close, whatever the “whites” could do, the “yellows” must be able 
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 For the history of this term, see Gollwitzer (1962). This shift towards Japan can be seen in the 
British novel The Yellow danger (1898) with a Japanese-Chinese main figure (Zachman 2007: 108). 
Already in July 1895 the Japanese daily Kokumin shinbun wrote of Western perceptions of the 
“rise of the yellow race” as mainly directed towards Japan and only secondarily towards China 
(Zachman 2007: 80f.). The painting (1895) by Knackfuß, commissioned by Kaiser Wilhelm, is 
well-known. For a collection of Western materials on the “yellow peril” in Chinese translation, 
including some Chinese reactions to this discourse (dating only from after the turn of the century, 
namely from the time of the Russo-Japanese war) see Lü/Zhang (1979). Some Chinese literary 
reactions to the “yellow peril” paradigm, again after the turn of the century, are discussed by Tsu 
(2005: ch. 3). 
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 Earlier references are extremely scarce, but with the war the term huangzhong (yellow race) 
gains currency in Chinese publications and was even used by Chinese chief negotiator at the 
Shimonoseki peace talks, Li Hongzhang, who hoped (in vain) to talk the Japanese into an alliance 
of the “yellows” against the “whites” and to lessen Japanese pressure on the defeated Chinese 
side (Dikötter 1992: 55). Casual checks of important Chinese newspapers suggest that the term 
huangzhong gained currency only with the Sino-Japanese war. 
57
 Among the pull factors were the Gold rush in America and the need for “coolies” to build 
railways in the West of North America as well as opportunities to gain a living in mines or as 
launderers. A decisive push factor was the huge Taiping rebellion in the 1850s to ‘60s which 
devastated great parts of central and southern China, together with an exploding population and 
early industrialisation leading to social dislocation and shifts on the job market. – In the US the 
“Exclusion Act” of the 1870s gave rise to a whole series of fiction portraying the “yellow peril” 
(without using that expression), due to Chinese emigration (Wu 1982). For late 19th century 
graphical representations of Chinese in the US see Choy/Dong/Hom (1994). Interestingly, earlier 
cartoons tended to use the word “Mongolians”, to be superseded then in time by “yellows” and 
meaning the Chinese. Only at the turn of the century was the “yellow peril” primarily directed 
against the Japanese (Choy/Dong/Hom 1994: 161). 
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to do as well, citing Japan as the visible proof (without openly mentioning the recent 
Sino-Japanese War). He immediately went on to “conclude”: “Since the Japanese 
race (Riben zhi zhong) originated in our country, it would be illogical to say that 
we cannot accomplish what they can!”,58 thus using the Japanese case to argue that 
China must have the same potential to rise in the future; this potential only had to 
be developed properly. And soon Chinese students would go to Japan to study in 
great numbers, hoping for a convenient “shortcut” to modernity provided by their 
“Asian neighbour”.59 
This wave of Chinese students going to Japan, in turn, gave a new twist to the 
relationship, because the “theoretical” model of Meiji Japan was now counterbal-
anced by personal experience: where racially discriminatory language towards Japan 
was common in China before and during the war (“apes”, “dwarfs” etc. – the Japa-
nese obviously doing the same and both heavily influenced by Western stereotypes 
of the other),60 after the war the Japanese looked down on China and the Chinese 
students (calling them, e.g., with the Japanese equivalent of Western derogatory 
“Chink”, chanchan bōzu, mocking their “monk-like” hairstyle).61 Through this more 
intensive personal contact between Chinese and Japanese, the problem of “same-
ness” or “difference” became more evident: to a certain degree, daily life contrasted 
with the “theoretical” discourse on “sameness” occasionally put forward by both 
sides, though with different motives. On the one hand, some Japanese argued for 
“racial unity” between China and Japan in parallel with a supposed “cultural-scriptural 
unity” (dōbun dōshu), be it out of emotional attachment to Chinese traditional culture 
engendered by their own educational upbringing, be it to further Japan’s very rational 
interests on the continent, or be it out of a genuine belief in “(East) Asianness” 
(Sato 1997). On the other hand, some Chinese argued for “sameness” with Japan to 
take over methods of reform that had obviously been successful or advocated it out 
of a genuine belief in Asianness (much rarer, though, in the Chinese case as the 
grudgingly “receiving” end in a newly adjusted asymmetrical relationship). 
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 See Liang’s above cited article (1896: 100). Cf. also Tsu (2005: 51), from which I have taken the 
wording of the sentence translated here. The article was written in 1896, not in 1897, as Tsu suggests. 
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 The classic study on Chinese students in Japan is Sanetō (1960). See also Huang (1975), Harrell 
(1992), Gen (1991). 
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 See Paine (2003) for the Western and Japanese perceptions of this war; for Chinese depictions of 
war scenes and comments in China, see e.g. the popular Dianshizhai huabao (Dianshizhai pictorial) 
of that period, using the derogatory terms wo (dwarfs) and kou (pirates) for the Japanese. The official 
documents also used the term “dwarfs” and “head of dwarfs” for the Tennō and avoided the “normal” 
term “Japanese” (Ribenren). See the material collections on the Sino-Japanese War: Qi (1989–1996) 
and Shao (2000 [1956]). The Japanese constantly complained about this. For the Chinese views on Japan 
at the time in general see Chu (1980). For a sample of Japanese depictions of the war see Japanische 
Farbholzschnitte II: Kriegsbilder aus der Meiji-Zeit (1986).  
61
 Cf. Keene (1971) and Sanetō (1960). Earlier images tended to be more positive. Friction first 
arose because of Japanese envy of Chinese trade domination (Kamachi 1980). 
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This mutual ambivalence continued and was also deeply influenced by the posi-
tions of the West: when the Boxer movement arose in China, the West – particu-
larly the German Kaiser as the most influential proponent of the “yellow peril” 
paradigm – again saw China as the “yellow peril”,62 and this in fact was probably 
the historical moment when the term gained real currency in Western politics. The 
Boxers, seen as a barbaric oriental backward movement, represented brute and 
blind force against the Allies as bearers of the torch of civilisation. The Japanese in 
this case openly sided with the Allies, dispatched the biggest contingent of soldiers 
and took pains to avoid being mixed up with the Chinese. Still, Westerners hesi-
tated to give the “yellow” Japanese full credit for their involvement in the Boxer 
war (Zachmann 2007: ch. 5). 
When the Russo-Japanese war (1904/05) saw Japan victorious, Westerners again 
identified Japan as the “yellow peril”63 – obviously since the Chinese no longer 
counted much and because the adversary in this war had been “Western”. In China, 
the Japanese victory was widely applauded (even though, again, achieved over 
Chinese soil, i.e. Manchuria, as in the Sino-Japanese War ten years earlier). It was 
interpreted as demonstrating the ability of “the yellows” and thus could again be 
used to argue for changes in China, following the Japanese model.64 Japan, on the 
other hand, was averse to “representing the yellows” by her victory and chose to 
distance herself from the “weak” Chinese who played no role in that war anyway, 
though it had been fought over her territory. 
The problem of “drawing the racial line” went on through history, and very ob-
viously the answer to where that line should be drawn depended much on the 
agenda of those who argued for or against including the other, reflecting historical 
power relations. At no time was there an agreed-upon dividing line. When China 
could “use” Japan as a model or wanted to argue for her own potential, she in-
cluded Japan. When China suffered from Japanese supremacy or aggression, “racial” 
difference was underlined. This became most evident during the course of the 20th 
century. The Second Sino-Japanese War and Japanese war atrocities in China led 
to a strongly racialised view of the “Japs”: in official remembering of those war 
atrocities which has played a key role in the government’s own legitimacy rhetoric 
in the PR China especially in the post-Mao era, i.e. since the 1980s, the “cruelness” 
of the Japanese character is often stressed: The Japanese are “by nature” bound to 
do cruel things. They are not portrayed as individuals committing crimes, but as 
“devils” capable of anything, which serves – in contrast – to underline the “civilised”, 
meek and victimised good Chinese.65 This basically “racist” view of the Japanese 
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 For the use of the “yellow peril” concept in Western politics see Mehnert (1995). 
63
 For an illustration of this shift, see also Linhart (2005). 
64
 For Chinese reactions to the Russo-Japanese War see Müller (2007). 
65
 Cf. also the interesting comment of the People’s Liberation Army writer Jin Hui in 1995, cited 
by Gries, that “other devils” must be further specified, like “Western devils”, “British devils” 
etc., but the Japanese are just “the devils” (Gries 2004: 93). 
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is not only transported by the Chinese government via textbooks, official TV, media 
etc., but is also sustained by popular nationalism which often goes much further in 
anti-Japanese racism than the government can tolerate for diplomatic reasons.66 
Conclusion 
From the above we may conclude that the Western concept of “race” that was 
introduced to China in the late 19th century encountered various problems that 
hampered and coloured its glocalisation. First of all, the term was not easy to coin 
in Chinese characters, since these always transported connotations that gave the 
Western term a certain twist, usually in the direction of descent, blending biology 
and culture. Furthermore, due to the translation work undertaken, the terms were 
mostly coined in Japan and then taken over into Chinese. In this sense, the concept 
was doubly “alien” to China. But for the term “race” itself, the question of racial 
taxonomies in Western race discourse proved to be problematic: how shall we deal 
with the fact that “they” call “us” “yellow” in the context of a hierarchical assign-
ment of “colours” with “white” at the top? As shown above, there were multiple ways 
of accepting, remoulding or rejecting this “colour” definition of “yellow”, in all cases 
reinterpreting it as not (or not simply) connoting skin colour, but investing it with 
some kind of cultural or genealogical meaning, and a general reluctance to use the 
alternate term “mongoloid” for historical and cultural reasons. In the setting of the 
time, a purely “scientific” biological categorisation was not of primary relevance, and 
“science” in any case was clearly no longer an “innocent” enterprise in the context 
of practiced imperialism around the globe. Thus, the “package” that was received in 
China was only the combination of “scientific” biology and Social Darwinism that 
raised the spectre of dire consequences for the survival of “races” in their mutual 
struggle, interlocking “race” with “cultural-civilizational abilities”. It was therefore 
only logical that the categories of “race” and “nation” were soon conflated – as they 
were in the West around the turn of the century. 
Furthermore, an uneasiness concerning the racial in- or out-group assigned by 
the West can be clearly detected in Chinese reactions to the “race” concept. If one 
accepted the “scientific” contention of mankind being divided into “races”, the 
question had to be addressed of where the boundaries should be drawn, i.e. who 
should count as “yellow”? From the Chinese side, this problem revolved around 
two main issues at the turn of the 20th century: whether or not to include the Man-
chus (and other minorities) and whether or not to include the Japanese. Here, the 
main concern was to find a discursive line between “culture” and “race”, which 
involved the ever present issue of power relations. Thus, China, like Japan, strug-
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 Cases in point are anti-Japanese demonstrations, often connected to the last war and the Nanjing 
massacre 1937, which tend to spin out of government control or are organised privately from the 
outset, as well as films like “Guizi lai le” (Devils on the Doorstep) in the 1990s that was officially 
banished for being overly anti-Japanese. 
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gled with an “unfavourable” foreign concept. But because Japan saw this concept 
as endangering her rise in the international field, and so being detrimental to her 
future, the Japanese largely avoided applying it to themselves. The Chinese, by 
contrast, made extensive use of it at times, though twisting it according to their 
needs. For the concept could be used both to explain the reasons for the country’s 
weakening position in the recent past, and it could be used to argue the merits of 
designing one’s own future, whether conceived as lying in reform or in revolution. 
But the addressees of this discursive use of the “race” concept “from below” were 
inner-Chinese adversaries (if one may for the moment also include the Manchus in 
this category), not “outsiders”. The “foreign concept” thus became a weapon for 
primarily internal political contests. 
In any case, it is obvious that the question of where to draw the “racial” line was 
never agreed upon and that arguments, for whatever line chosen, were determined 
by the agenda of the person arguing. The whole “race concept” was manipulated 
by Chinese intellectuals – on whom the focus has been here – in various ways, of-
ten toying with its pseudo-scientificy in the game to win over opponents or at least 
to argue for one’s own political aims. Thus, the “glocalisers” were active agents 
and not only “receiving ends” of a Western “hegemonic discourse” on “race”. The 
answer to the question of being “yellow” or not and of who constitutes “us” was 
therefore constantly shifting, revealing the crucial importance of linguistic, cultural 
and above all historical contingency in connection with the specific motivation of 
individual actors in the “glocalising” process. 
Although more than a century has elapsed since the time focused upon here, i.e. 
around 1900, the basic strategies of handling the “race” concept are still, or rather 
again, relevant. On the surface of today’s discourse the “outmoded” “race” paradigm 
is again superseded by the “culture” paradigm, due among other things to globally 
received concepts like Huntington’s theses which – to a certain extent – have sub-
stituted earlier “racial competition” with “civilizational clashes”. Thus the modern 
Chinese “culture” paradigm is clearly different from the traditional Chinese Confucian 
one. After Mao and – a fortiori – after the Tian’anmen massacre, “race” and “culture” 
have been consciously blended to bolster a newly defined “Chineseness” with inte-
grative potential vis-à-vis Taiwan and all Overseas Chinese in a hoped-for “rise of 
China” in the 21st century.67 Thus, current Chinese nationalism presents itself under 
the label of “culture”, but racial elements are integrated (Dikötter 2002: esp. 507) 
and occasionally resurface, as demonstrated especially by the latent confrontation 
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 This parallels – and maybe reflects – the Japanese Nihonjinron (discourses on Japaneseness) which 
are an even more outspokenly “racialised” reinterpretation of “Japaneseness”. On the other hand 
it is interesting to note that at the same time the idea of “East Asianness” came to be propagated 
via the catch word of a “cultural sphere” of the “common script” (Jap. Kanji bunkaken, Chin. Hanzi 
wenhuaquan) or a shared legacy of Confucianism. This again leads to the conclusion that in fact 
all these constructions are mainly aimed against an “x” which for both countries is still primarily 
“the West” and only in second place the “Asian neighbour”. 
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with the “racially-culturally” “different” West68 and the “similar” Japanese69 as China’s 
chief competitors on the contemporary global scene. 
Glossary 
chanchan bōzu チャンチャン坊主 Manzu 滿族 
da minzuzhuyi 大民族主義 Menggu 蒙古 
dōbun dōshu 同文同種 Miao 苗 
dochakuka 土着化 minzu (Jap. minzoku) 民族 
Guizi lai le 鬼子來了 minzuzhuyi daweiren 民族主義大偉人 
Han 漢 Nihonjinron 日本人論 
Hanzu 漢族 renzhong (Jap. jinshu) 人種 
Huangdi 黃帝 Riben zhi zhong 日本之種 
Huangshu 黃書 Ribenren 日本人 
Hui 回 Song Jiaoren 宋教仁 
huangzhong 黃種 Tang Caichang 唐才常 
jinrui 人類 Tōyō shiyō 東洋史要 
Jinrui Gakkai 人類学会 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 
jinruigaku 人類学 wo 倭 
xing 姓 Kanji bunkaken (Chin. Hanzi wenhua-
quan) 漢字文化圏 Yan Fu 嚴複 
Kokumin shinbun 国民新聞 zhendan 震旦 
kou 寇 zhonglei (Jap. shurui) 種類 
Kuwabara Jitsuzō 桑原隲藏 zhongzu (Jap. shuzoku) 種族 
Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 zong 宗 
Li Shizeng 李石曾 zu 族 
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 Cf. the Chinese reactions to the NATO Belgrade bombing in which the Chinese embassy was hit 
(1999), or to the US military “spy” plane incident shortly after, which blended anti-American feeling, 
a “racial” inferiority complex, alleged historical “victimisation” and global-economic competitiveness 
against the backdrop of a “containing China” policy advocated in the US. For a recent discussion 
of these events see Gries (2004). 
69
 Well-known cases include the textbook controversies or the Spreatly Islands issue coming up 
time and again, mixing nationalism, war memories and anti-Japanese feelings with a “racial” overtone, 
occasionally referring to “common blood” as the distinctive marker of (Greater) “Chineseness”. 
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